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AGGREGATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS: WILL THE
REAL AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY
PLEASE STAND UP?
Christopher J. Willis*
With the class action device becoming ever more popular, and
with state-law class actions increasing in frequency, the federal
courts have been confronted with a number of perplexing issues
regarding federal diversity jurisdiction in class actions. The tradi-
tional rules regarding federal jurisdiction over state-law class ac-
tions have been heavily litigated in recent years, particularly the
amount-in-controversy1 requirement for diversity jurisdiction.2
This litigation has come mainly from class-action defendants
wishing to remove cases filed in state court to federal court, but it
has also emanated from class plaintiffs' desire to file actions in a
federal forum. This Article explores an amount-in-controversy is-
sue that has sharply divided the lower federal courts in recent
years: whether the amount of punitive damages sought by a class
of plaintiffs may be aggregated 3 for the purpose of reaching the
* Law clerk to the Honorable James H. Hancock, U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama. J.D., summa cum laude, 1996, Cumberland School of
Law, Samford University; B.A., 1993, University of Alabama, Birmingham. In the
interest of full disclosure, the author wishes to note that he did extensive work in the
Tapscott case discussed herein while employed as a law clerk at Sirote & Permutt,
P.C. The author wishes to thank Professor Andrew R. Klein, John R. Chiles, C. Lee
Reeves, Samuel M. Hill, and Wilson F. Green for their comments on earlier drafts of
this Article.
1. The amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 will increase
from $50,000 to $75,000 effective January 17, 1997. See Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1996, P.L. 104-317, § 205 (Oct. 19, 1996).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
3. The term "aggregation" is a bit misleading in this context, as it implies add-
ing separate amounts together to reach the threshold. A punitive damage award in a
class action is a unitary sum that will later be divided among the class members.
Thus, it would be more accurate to pose the issue as whether that award should be
divided among the class members for the purpose of determining the amount in con-
troversy. However, all but one of the cases that address this issue refer to it as
"aggregation." This Article does the same.
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amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdic-
tion.
Until recently no court of appeals had addressed the issue of
punitive damages aggregation, but the numerous published district
court opinions had established a clear majority against aggrega-
tion.4 The two courts of appeals to weigh in on this issue-the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits-have held that punitive damages
claimed in a class action may be aggregated to reach the $50,000
threshold for diversity jurisdiction.5 The Eleventh Circuit case,
Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp.,6 serves as a prime example of
how the aggregation issue can arise.
In Tapscott the plaintiffs filed a putative class action against a
number of retailers of goods in Alabama state court.7 The com-
plaint alleged various claims under Alabama law arising from the
defendants' sales of extended service policies in consumer credit
transactions.8 The state-court pleadings requested unspecified
compensatory and punitive damages for the putative class, alleg-
edly comprising approximately ten thousand members.9 One of
the defendants, Lowe's Home Centers, removed the case to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on the
basis of diversity of citizenship from the putative class members.' 0
After removal the plaintiffs sought remand and filed affidavits as-
serting that the amount in controversy did not exceed $50,000 for
each member of the putative class. 1 The district court denied the
motion to remand, reasoning that the amount in controversy was
met by the aggregate amount of punitive damages sought for the
class, rather than the pro rata damages claimed for each putative
class member.'2 The jurisdictional issue was presented to the
Eleventh Circuit via interlocutory appeal, and the court of appeals
4. See infra Part II.
5. See Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996); Allen
v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995). Allen was not a class action.
Instead, 512 plaintiffs joined under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to assert common claims against the defendants. See id. at 1329. Nevertheless, the
aggregation analysis is the same whether the multiple claimants are joined under
Rule 20 or Rule 23. See id.
6. 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996).
7. See idU at 1355.
8. See idl
9. See id. at 1355 & n.2.
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affirmed the district court's holding.' 3
By allowing the punitive damages claimed by a class of plain-
tiffs to be viewed in the aggregate, the Eleventh Circuit has made
it vastly easier to establish the amount in controversy in class ac-
tions. Instead of having the onerous burden of proving that the
amount in controversy exceeded $50,000 for each putative class
member-a figure of $500 million in Tapscott-the Tapscott de-
fendants only needed to prove that the total amount of punitive
damages claimed by the putative class exceeded $50,000.
The issue of aggregating punitive damages to reach the
$50,000 threshold is far from decided. Indeed, ten circuits have yet
to address the issue, and district courts outside the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits remain reluctant to allow aggregation. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has not addressed this issue. This Article brings to-
gether and summarizes the discordant case law. Part I sets the
stage by detailing the relevant rules enunciated by the Supreme
Court. Part II examines the rationales advanced by courts that
have disallowed aggregation. Part III looks at the reasoning of
courts that have allowed aggregation. Part IV concludes that the
pro-aggregation courts have the better argument, from both a
precedential and policy perspective.
I. THE STARTING POINT: SNYDER AND ZAHN
The U.S. Supreme Court has never heard an aggregation case
involving punitive damages sought by a class of plaintiffs, but two
cases-Snyder v. Harris4 and Zahn v. International Paper C6.15-
13. See id. at 1356 n.4.
14. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
15. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). There is great debate about whether Zahn is still good
law in light of the recent enactment of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994). It can be argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1367's grant of supple-
mental jurisdiction over all "related" claims means that only the named plaintiff
must satisfy the jurisdictional amount. Therefore, a federal court can exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction over class members whose claims do not exceed $50,000. Two
courts of appeals have accepted this argument, while numerous district courts have
rejected it. Compare Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d
928 (7th Cir. 1996) and In re Abbott Laboratories, 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (both
holding that Zahn has been overruled by § 1367) with Packard v. Provident Nat'l
Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993) (not reaching the issue, but listing nu-
merous district court cases that have held that Zahn is not overruled).
It is important to note that the Zahn holding is not directly relevant to the
aggregation issue-Zahn reiterated the traditional aggregation rules in dicta-but
Zahn's holding concerned supplemental jurisdiction over absent class members
whose claims fell below the jurisdictional amount. See 1 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL.,
January 1997]
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have laid down the general rules applicable to the aggregation is-
sue.
In Snyder the plaintiff brought a class action asserting claims
under Missouri law against the directors of a corporation in which
she held stock.16 She alleged that the directors had purchased the
corporation's stock at an unfairly high price in an attempt to ob-
tain control of the company.17 The plaintiff sought only compen-
satory damages of $8,740-just short of the $10,000 amount-in-
controversy requirement at the time.18 The plaintiff argued that
the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 had
legislatively overruled the traditional aggregation doctrine, and
urged the district court to aggregate her claim with the claims of
the other four thousand shareholders whom she sought to repre-
sent.19 The district court rejected this argument and dismissed the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 20 The district court's
judgment was affirmed by both the Eighth Circuit 21 and the Su-
preme Court.22 The Supreme Court reiterated the traditional rule
that
the separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs
cannot be aggregated in order to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount requirement. Aggregation has been permitted
only (1) in cases in which a single plaintiff seeks to aggre-
gate two or more of his own claims against a single defen-
dant and (2) in cases in which two or more plaintiffs unite
to enforce a single title or right in which they have a com-
mon and undivided interest.23
The Supreme Court held that, because the compensatory claims
made by the class of shareholders were of a "separate and distinct"
nature, they could not be aggregated to reach the jurisdictional
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.97[5], at 926 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1994) (noting that "Zahn was not an aggregation case; it was a supplemental ju-
risdiction case"). So, the discussion of Zahn in this Article leaves aside the § 1367
issue, concentrating only on the aspect of Zahn that reaffirms the traditional rules
concerning aggregation of multiple plaintiffs' claims.




20. See Snyder v. Harris, 268 F. Supp. 701, 705 (E.D. Mo. 1967).
21. See Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968).
22. See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 341-42.
23. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 30:775
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amount.24
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional aggregation
doctrine in Zahn. In that case the named plaintiff sought to repre-
sent a class of waterfront property owners who claimed that the
defendant paper company had discharged pollution into the water
near their homes. 25 The named plaintiff had a claim for more than
the $10,000 requirement, but the district court found that the ab-
sent class members' claims did not satisfy the jurisdictional amount
and denied class certification. 26 The Second Circuit affirmed,27 as
did the Supreme Court.28 Specifically, the Supreme Court held
that, in a class action, all of the putative class members must satisfy
the amount-in-controversy requirement individually when their
demands are separate and distinct.29 The Court also reiterated the
classic aggregation rule:
When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct
demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single
suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the requi-
site jurisdictional amount; but when several plaintiffs unite
to enforce a single title or right, in which they have a
common and undivided interest, it is enough if their inter-
ests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount.30
Snyder and Zahn conclusively established that, when class-
action plaintiffs assert separate and distinct claims, aggregation is
improper. However, neither case gives any guidance to a court at-
tempting to decide whether a particular interest is separate and
distinct or common and undivided. Various federal courts have
grappled with the question of whether a punitive damage award
24. See id. at 34142.
25. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 291-92.
26. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430,434-35 (D. Vt. 1971).
27. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1036 (2d Cir. 1972).
28. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 302.
29. See id. at 301. This holding is brought into question by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See
1 MOORE ET AL., supra note 15, 0.97[5], at 927-28.
30. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 294 (emphasis added) (citing Troy Bank v. G. A. White-
head & Co., 222 U.S. 39,4041 (1911)). Snyder and Zahn were certainly not the first
cases to announce the dichotomy between separate and distinct and common and
undivided interests; the general rule governing aggregation appears to be nearly as
old as diversity jurisdiction itself. For early cases applying the rule, see Gibson v.
Shufeldt, 122 U.S. 27, 30 (1887); Davies v. Corbin, 112 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1884); The
"Connemara," 103 U.S. 754,755-56 (1880); and Shields v. Thomas, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
3,3-6 (1854).
January 1997]
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sought by a class of plaintiffs is a common or separate interest.31
The next two parts of this Article summarize the reasoning ad-
vanced by courts reaching both conclusions.
II. THE CASE AGAINST AGGREGATION
A number of district courts have rejected the argument that a
punitive damage fund sought by a class of plaintiffs should be ag-
gregated to reach the $50,000 threshold. These courts have ad-
vanced three arguments in support of their holdings: (1) the policy
of limiting federal diversity jurisdiction represented by Zahn, (2)
the fact that individual class members could bring separate claims
and seek separate awards of punitive damages, and (3) the belief
that aggregation is only appropriate when all of the plaintiffs'
claims arise from a single transaction or event, rather than sepa-
rate transactions.32
A. The Policy of Limiting Federal Diversity Jurisdiction
Several district courts that have rejected the aggregation ar-
gument have justified their holdings by reasoning that to allow ag-
gregation of punitive damages would be contrary to the policies
expressed in Zahn, perhaps referring to the "policy" of limiting
federal diversity jurisdiction.33 This reference to Zahn is puzzling
31. See infra Parts II & III.
32. Some of the citations in this section are to opinions from district courts within
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. These cases have been overruled by Allen and Tap-
scott. I discuss them here solely to evaluate their reasoning.
33. See Asten v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 914 F. Supp. 430, 433 (D. Kan.
1996); Garcia v. General Motors Corp., 910 F. Supp. 160, 166 (D.N.J. 1995); Visin-
tine v. SAAB Auto., A.B., 891 F. Supp. 496, 499 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Bassett v. Toyota
Motor Credit Corp., 818 F. Supp. 1462, 1466-68 (S.D. Ala. 1993); Hayes v. Fireman's
Fund Mortgage Corp., No. 91-C-4544, 1991 WL 255529, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25,
1991); Goldin v. American Airlines, No. 90-C-768, 1990 WL 77630, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill.
May 21, 1990). Both Bassett and Goldin rely on Goldberg v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 678 F.2d
1365 (9th Cir. 1982). Goldberg rejected a claim that an attorney's fee award claimed
by a plaintiff class could be aggregated; the Goldberg court observed that aggrega-
tion "would seriously undermine and [is] contrary to the rule expressed by the Su-
preme Court in Zahn." Id. at 1367. Goldberg did not discuss the issue of whether
the attorney's fee was a common and undivided interest or a separate and distinct
one.
Bassett also relied heavily on Lindsey v. Alabama Tel. Co., 576 F.2d 593 (5th
Cir. 1978). Lindsey contains a brief remark about aggregation of class members'
claims, and cites both Snyder and Zahn. See id. at 594. Although the plaintiff class
did request punitive damages in Lindsey, it is not apparent whether the Fifth Circuit
was even presented with the issue of whether the punitive damages sought were a
common and undivided interest of the class. The Lindsey opinion does not discuss
[Vol. 30:775
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since the only policy actually expressed by the Court in Zahn was
that separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated to reach
the jurisdictional amount.34 Zahn's holding was based upon the
assumption that the class members' interests were separate and
distinct, and Zahn says nothing about how a court should differen-
tiate between common and separate claims.35 The reliance of
these opinions on Zahn seems circular since the courts decide not
to allow aggregation based on Zahn, while Zahn-by its own
terms-only applies if the claims are separate and distinct. By
merely invoking Zahn, these courts have assumed the conclusion
to the question presented and have bypassed the real issue-
whether a punitive damages fund sought by a class falls into the
separate and distinct category or is really a common and undivided
interest.
Perhaps by referring to Zahn, these courts are impliedly re-
jecting aggregation on the basis that it would expand federal di-
versity jurisdiction. At least one commentator has suggested that
the policy behind Zahn was to limit the diversity caseload of the
federal courts, 36 and a number of courts refusing to allow aggrega-
tion have noted that one reason for doing so is "to keep the diver-
sity caseload of the federal courts under some modicum of con-
the issue of whether punitive damages are common and undivided or separate and
distinct; it simply recited that, generally, class members' claims cannot be aggregated.
See id.
At least one other court has followed Bassett's lead in finding that Lindsey
forecloses punitive damages aggregation. See Granier v. Eparka Shipping, Inc., Nos.
CIV.A. 94-3990 to 94-3992, 1995 WL 91129, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1995). However,
both courts of appeals bound by Lindsey-the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits-have not
interpreted it as a holding precluding punitive damages aggregation, despite specific
citation to Lindsey in both circuits' opinions. See Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp.,
77 F.3d 1353, 1357 n.9 (11th Cir. 1996); Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326,
1332 n.9 (5th Cir. 1995).
34. See supra notes 15,25-30 and accompanying text.
35. There is some language in Zahn that can be read to mean that class mem-
bers' interests are never common and undivided when they invoke Rule 23(b)(3)-
the "spurious" class action. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 296-
97 (1973). However, a better reading of this portion of Zahn is that when plaintiffs
are united only by the commonalities of law and fact required by Rule 23(b)(3), their
interests are not necessarily common and undivided. Zahn does not foreclose the
possibility that Rule 23(b)(3) class members might have a common and undivided
interest in the recovery sought; it merely states that the prosecution of the action un-
der Rule 23(b)(3) is not enough to create a common and undivided interest. This
reading is particularly appropriate when one considers the issue the Court was ad-
dressing at that point in Zahn-the effect of the 1966 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on the traditional aggregation rules.
36. See 1 MOORE ET AL., supra note 15, 0.97[5], at 927.
January 1997]
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trol."37
However, rejecting the aggregation argument on this basis is
incorrect for two reasons. First, it substitutes a general policy con-
cern for the established legal rule as the basis for deciding a juris-
dictional issue. Second, and more important, there are counter-
vailing policy concerns that balance the need to cut down on the
federal courts' workload. If the rationale behind diversity removal
jurisdiction is that out-of-state defendants will be subject to bias at
the hands of local courts, and their interest in avoiding bias only
becomes significant enough to justify removal when the amount in
controversy exceeds $50,000, it seems quite clear that the same
policy interests favor the removal rights of a defendant faced with
a $500,000,000 punitive damage claim by a class of ten thousand
plaintiffs. 38 The same is true with respect to a case filed in federal
37. Haisch v. Allstate Ins. Co., No Civ-96-1647, 1996 WL 617339, at *6 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 22, 1996) (citing Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 (3d Cir.
1993)); see Hamel v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. CIV.A. 95-6554, 1996 WL 106120, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1996); Pierson v. Source Perrier, S.A., 848 F. Supp. 1186, 1188
(E.D. Pa. 1994); see also Bishop v. General Motors Corp., 925 F. Supp. 294, 298-99
(D.N.J. 1996) (stating that the purpose behind the amount-in-controversy require-
ment is to limit the federal docket to substantial cases).
38. Commentators have been debating the continued vitality of the "local bias"
justification for diversity jurisdiction for years, and a consensus is nowhere in sight.
The Federal Courts Study Committee concluded that the amount of such bias is
"probably small." REPORT TO THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE
STATES, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE: WORKING PAPERS AND
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 452 (1990); see also 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3601, at 356-57 (1984) (concluding that "it is
difficult to believe that prejudice against a litigant based upon his being a citizen of a
different state, is a significant factor"). But see Ian Anderson et al., Report of the
New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on the Recommendation of the
Federal Courts Study Committee to Abolish Diversity Jurisdiction, 158 F.R.D. 185,
200-02 (1995) (arguing that the Federal Courts Study Committee was mistaken in
concluding that no local bias exists); Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction:
Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOK. L. REv. 197, 201-05 (1982)
(arguing that local bias still exists). Congress has chosen not to eliminate diversity
jurisdiction, and to the extent that the local bias rationale for diversity still exists, a
class action with a huge punitive damage claim certainly invokes that rationale.
Unable to come up with any real empirical evidence of local bias, supporters
of diversity jurisdiction have also defended its continued existence by noting that
federal courts tend to be of higher quality than state courts. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra § 3601 (noting that "[t]here may be merit to this argument"); Marsh, supra, at
210-12 (arguing that the superiority of federal courts to state courts justifies diversity
jurisdiction). This rationale, if accepted, argues strongly in favor of allowing aggre-
gation. Large class actions-the most common context in which the aggregation is-
sue arises---carry with them complex jurisdictional, choice-of-law, causation, and
other issues. If diversity jurisdiction is justified by higher-quality courts, then surely
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court-a class of plaintiffs should be able to avail themselves of a
federal forum when widespread wrongdoing is alleged, and the
$50,000 amount-in-controversy threshold should not be applied to
keep hundred-million-dollar cases out of federal court.
In short, the rejection of the aggregation argument cannot rest
on an appeal to Zahn or the policy of limiting federal diversity ju-
risdiction. Zahn tells us nothing about which interests are separate
and distinct rather than common and undivided, and the policy
considerations favoring aggregation are at least as strong as those
that counsel against it.
B. The Availability of Individual Claims
Some courts have held that a punitive damages fund sought by
a class of plaintiffs is not a common and undivided interest be-
cause, if the class members brought their claims individually, each
could make a separate claim for punitive damages.39 The avail-
ability of individual actions, each with a claim for punitive dam-
ages, leads these courts to conclude that the class members' inter-
ests in the punitive damages sought are separate and distinct.
40
complex cases are those most deserving of a federal forum. In addition to the puta-
tive higher quality of federal courts generally, the federal system gives litigants the
opportunity to make use of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, an oppor-
tunity not afforded in state courts. Because mass tort cases, and other class actions,
are often litigated in separate class actions filed in separate states, the interests of
consistency and judicial economy argue in favor of allowing those cases greater ac-
cess to the federal system and the Multidistrict panel. These policy arguments, while
certainly not dispositive of the aggregation issue, certainly act as a counterweight to
the principle of limiting diversity jurisdiction often used to reject aggregation.
39. See, e.g., Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1341 (5th Cir. 1995)
(DeMoss, J., dissenting); Haisch, 1996 WL 617339, at *5; Bishop, 925 F. Supp. at 297;
Hasek v. Chrysler Corp., No. 95 C 579, 1996 WL 48602, at *2 (N.D. 11. Feb. 5, 1996);
Visintine v. SAAB Auto., 891 F. Supp. 496, 498 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Anderson v. Shell
Oil Co., CIV.A.No. 93-2235, 1994 WL 702022, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 13, 1994); Teal v.
Associates Fin. Life Ins. Co., CIV.A.No. 94-D-732-N, 1995 WL 376930, at *3 (M.D.
Ala. Sept. 29, 1994); Clement v. Occidental Chem. Corp., CIV.A.No. 94-1315, 94-
1316, 94-1317, 1994 WL 479155, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 1994) ("Plaintiffs here
could individually assert a punitive damages claim."); Pierson, 848 F. Supp. at 1189;
Smiley v. Citibank, N.A., 863 F. Supp. 1156, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Hayes v. Fire-
man's Fund Mortgage Corp., No. 91 C 4544, 1991 WL 255529, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
25, 1991); Kasky v. Perrier Group of Am., No. CIV. 91-0489, 1991 WL 577038, at *1-
2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1991).
40. Language in one older Supreme Court case can be read to support this ar-
gument. See Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 41 (1911) (holding
that two plaintiffs' interest in a vendor's lien was common and undivided because it
was a claim "neither can enforce in the absence of the other"). The cases seem to be
in agreement that the success or failure of individual claims must affect the rights of
coplaintiffs in order to allow aggregation, but that rule becomes the starting point,
January 1997]
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The logical fallacy in this reasoning is that, in its emphasis on
the availability of individual actions, it ignores the fact that the
plaintiffs have chosen to pursue their claims as a class. They are
all seeking to punish the defendant for the same act or same series
of related acts, and their pursuit of class adjudication makes it
clear that they have joined together to punish and deter the defen-
dant's wrongdoing with a single award of punitive damages
awarded by the jury for the class as a whole. Although the class
members' punitive damages might be separate and distinct if each
class member pursued an individual action, the class action ,unites
the class members, and they seek their punitive damages as a sin-
gle fund awarded for the benefit of the entire class without regard
tohow much of the fund will later be awarded to each class mem-
ber.41
In addition, the "individual action" argument assumes that
each class member could assert a claim against the defendant for
the same conduct or course of conduct without affecting the rights
not the conclusion, in the punitive damages context. It might be argued that numer-
ous individual suits for punitive damages could proceed without affecting one an-
other, but the success or failure of individual plaintiffs' claims will affect the rights of
coplaintiffs if a single award of punitive damages is made in a class action. So, for
those courts that apply this test, the real focus is on whether the procedural posture
of the case-class action versus individual claim-affects the plaintiffs' interest in the
recovery. Because punitive damages are not designed to serve the compensatory
needs of individual plaintiffs, the better argument is that they are always common
and undivided, but single-plaintiff suits simply present no opportunities for aggrega-
tion. In the class action context, the role of punitive damages-punishing and deter-
ring class-wide wrongful conduct-is more closely aligned with the procedural pos-
ture of the case and aggregation is clearly appropriate.
In addition, while Troy Bank notes that neither plaintiff could enforce the
vendor's lien at issue without the other's presence, this factor is not a necessary ele-
ment of a common and undivided claim. For example, in Davies v. Corbin, 112 U.S.
36 (1884), a number of judgment creditors sued to require a county tax collector to
collect a tax to pay their judgments. See id. at 39-40. The Supreme Court specifically
noted that each of the individual creditors possessed the right to compel collection of
the tax, even though it would benefit all of the plaintiffs. See id. at 41. So, while the
necessity of joining all the plaintiffs in an action may have supported aggregation in
Troy Bank, it is not a necessary prerequisite to aggregation. This conclusion is fur-
ther supported by the fact that, of all of the Supreme Court's aggregation cases, only
Troy Bank emphasizes the necessity of joining all of the potential plaintiffs in order
for any of the claimants to recover. See Troy Bank, 222 U.S. at 41. Most of the cases
applying the aggregation rule use the test later adopted by the First Circuit-if the
defendant has no interest in the apportionment of the recovery among the plaintiffs,
the plaintiffs' interest is common and undivided. See Berman v. Narragansett Racing
Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311,316 (1st Cir. 1969).
41. See Allen, 63 F.3d at 1334.
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of other class members to recover punitive damages.42 However, a
large punitive damage award recovered by the first plaintiff to re-
ceive a judgment against a defendant could very well make it im-
possible for the defendant to pay future punitive awards, or could
reduce the amount of such awards, since prior punitive damage
awards and the defendant's ability to pay are factors considered in
assessing punitive damages.43 A defendant's liability for punitive
damages, or its ability to pay such damages, is not unlimited.
Therefore, individual suits for punitive damages could have a very
real effect on later punitive damage awards based on the same
conduct.
The fact that the class members' demands could be separate
and distinct if they pursued their claims individually does not mean
that the punitive damages sought by the class when they choose to
proceed together are also separate. In fact, it seems more logical to
conclude that, since the punitive damage award will be made for
the class as a whole, it is a common interest subject to aggregation.
C. The Source of the Rights Asserted
The final rationale advanced in opposition to the aggregation
of punitive damages in class actions is the source-of-the-rights test.
Courts employing this test reason that if the claims of the class
members arise from separate and distinct transactions-such as
separate insurance contracts or separate sale or loan transac-
42. See Hayes, 1991 WL 255529, at *3 (citing Hughes v. Encyclopedia Britannica,
199 F.2d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1952)) ("Claims are considered separate and distinct
when the class members can individually bring a separate action without affecting
the rights of other class members.").
43. See, e.g., Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989)
(holding the financial position of the defendant and any previous punitive awards
arising from the same conduct are factors to be considered in reviewing punitive
damages). In Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), the U.S. Su-
preme Court found that Alabama's system for awarding punitive damages did not
violate due process because of the presence of the Green Oil factors in judicial re-
view of punitive awards. See id. at 18-19. Presumably, a series of punitive damage
awards that repetitively punish the same defendant for the same conduct will reach a
point after which further awards will offend due process. See id. at 18 (warning that
fixing punitive damage awards could "invite extreme results that jar one's constitu-
tional sensibilities").
Other states also require consideration of the defendant's financial position
or prior punishment for the same conduct when punitive damages are reviewed. See,
e.g., Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v. Winston & Strawn, 907 P.2d 506,520 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995); Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 117, 813 P.2d 1348, 1355-56, 284
Cal. Rptr. 318, 325-26 (1991); Bill Branch Chevrolet v. Burkert, 521 So. 2d 153, 155
(Fla. App. 1988).
January 1997]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:775
tions-then their interests in the relief sought are also separate and
distinct and cannot be aggregated.44
This argument suffers several flaws. First, it ignores the Su-
preme Court's guidance on this issue. In two cases-Troy Bank v.
G.A. Whitehead & Co.45 and Davies v. Corbin46 - the Supreme
Court allowed aggregation of plaintiffs' interests that arose from
separate and distinct transactions. In Troy Bank a landowner sold
the defendant a parcel of land, taking two promissory notes and a
vendor's lien as security for the debt.47 The seller then assigned
each of the promissory notes to one of the plaintiffs in separate
contractual transactions.48 When the two plaintiffs sued together
to enforce the vendor's lien, the Supreme Court held that their in-
44. See Haisch v. Allstate Ins. Co., No Civ-96-1647, 1996 WL 617339, at *5-6 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 22, 1996); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL-
991, 1996 WL 257570, at *4 (E.D. La. May 16, 1996); Villarreal v. Chrysler Corp.,
No. C-95-4414, 1996 WL 116832, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1996); Hamel v. Allstate
Indem. Co., No. CIV.A.95-6554,1996 WL 106120, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1996); Teal
v. Associates Fin. Life Ins. Co., CIV.A.No. 94-D-732-N, 1995 WL 376930, at *3;
Parham v. Stouffer Foods Corp., 882 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Hall v.
ITT Fin. Serv., 891 F. Supp. 580, 583 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Bassett v. Toyota Motor
Credit Corp., 818 F. Supp. 1462, 1466-68 (S.D. Ala. 1993); Poindexter v. National
Mortgage Corp., No. 91 C 4223, 1991 WL 278454, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 1991).
The Bassett court wrote:
In the opinion of the undersigned, where relief is sought for the breach of
separately negotiated contracts, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imaginehow the interests to be adjudicated could be characterized as a common in-
terest belonging to the group as a whole rather than to the individual plain-
tiffs. In the case sub judice, each class member has a separate insurance
contract and could in theory bring an individual action for the Defendant's
alleged improper conduct with regard to those contracts. Thus, this class
cannot be said to possess a "common and undivided interest" and are in
fact stating separate and distinct claims, the value of which must be ana-
lyzed in order to determine whether the jurisdictional amount has been met
or exceeded.
Bassett, 818 F. Supp. at 1467.
The source-of-the-rights test also finds support in the language of some appel-
late court opinions deciding whether relief other than punitive damages is common
or separate. See Griffith v. Sealtite Corp., 903 F.2d 495, 498 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that where the "underlying causes of action" are separate and distinct, aggregation is
impermissible); Burns v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 246, 250-51 (8th
Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiffs whose causes of action arise from separate insur-
ance contracts may not aggregate). However, this argument was expressly rejected
in both Tapscott and Allen. See Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp, 77 F.3d 1353,
1358 (11th Cir. 1996); Allen, 63 F.3d at 1331 n.6.
45. 222 U.S. 39 (1911).
46. 112 U.S. 36 (1884).
47. See Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39,40 (1911).
48. See id.
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terest in the lien was "common and undivided."49 The Supreme
Court held that "while their claims under the notes were separate
and distinct, their claim under the vendor's lien was single and
undivided, and the lien was sought to be enforced as a common se-
curity for the payment of both notes.
'50
In Davies several persons sued a county and obtained separate
and distinct judgments against the county.51 Later they jointly
sued to require the county tax collector to collect a tax on the
county's citizens to satisfy their judgments.52 Although each
plaintiff's interest arose from a separate and distinct judgment, the
Supreme Court held that their interest in enforcing the tax was
common and undivided and allowed aggregation.
53
There can be no doubt that Troy Bank and Davies remain
good law, despite their age. In Snyder v. Harris54 the Supreme
Court insisted that it would not change the traditional aggregation
rules because of the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and traced the aggregation rule all the way back to
1832.55 In addition, the Court in Snyder twice cited Troy Bank as
representing an example of the proper statement of the rules gov-
erning aggregation.56 Zahn v. International Paper Co. 57 the Su-
preme Court's latest statement on aggregation-albeit in dicta-
also cites Troy Bank with approval and states that the aggregation
rules "were firmly rooted in prior cases dating from 1832, and have
continued to be the accepted construction" of the "matter in con-
troversy" language in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.58 So, the Supreme Court's
holdings applying the ancient common and undivided test clearly
reject the notion that aggregation is improper when the individual
plaintiffs' interests arise from separate transactions. Rather, the
Supreme Court's holdings require an inquiry into the plaintiffs'
individual or group entitlement to the relief claimed.59
49. Id. at 41.
50. Id.
51. See Davies v. Corbin, 112 U.S. 36,37 (1884).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 40-41.
54. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
55. See id. at 335-39.
56. See id. at 336-37.
57. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
58. See id. at 294-95 (footnote omitted).
59. The source-of-the-rights test would also generate the wrong result in mass
tort claims for compensatory damages. The well-accepted law is that claims for com-
pensatory damages are separate and distinct because each plaintiff individually
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The second problem with the source-of-the-rights test is that it
fails to take into account the nature of the punitive damages fund
in a class action. Even if the plaintiffs' underlying claims arise
from separate and distinct transactions, it does not follow that a
single punitive damages fund sought by the class as a whole is a
separate and distinct demand. It seems more logical to conclude
the opposite-that when the class of plaintiffs comes together and
attempts to collect a single award of punitive damages that (1) will
be awarded to the class as a whole and (2) will accomplish the
same goal of punishment and deterrence with respect to all of the
class members, it has created a potential recovery of punitive dam-
ages in which class members share a common and undivided inter-
est.
t Finally, the source-of-the-rights test would draw an arbitrary,
illogical line with respect to aggregation. If the plaintiffs were
claiming to be injured as a result of a single act by the defendant-
forexample, a plane crash, chemical spill, or other single event-
then presumably the source-of-the-rights test would operate to al-
low aggregation since the underlying causes of action asserted by
the plaintiffs all arose from the same event, rather than separate
transactions. However, if a defendant injured a class of plaintiffs
by repeating the exact same conduct-for example insurance
fraud-in each separate transaction, aggregation would be forbid-
den. The source-of-the-rights test would thereby operate to allow
aggregation and disallow it in two contexts logically indistinguish-
able from one another-where the plaintiffs are entitled to puni-
tive damages as a group because the single act of the defendant
"owns" the right to collect those damages, which are designed solely to satisfy each
plaintiff's particular losses. See, e.g., Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores a Pequena
Escala 0 Artesanales de Colombia v. Dow Quimica de Colombia, S.A., 988 F.2d 559,
563 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that compensation for the personal injuries sustained by
the plaintiffs are clearly individual and not aggregable).
However, if the source-of-the-rights test is the proper way to determine
whether a group of plaintiffs have separate and distinct or common and undivided
interests, then any claim for compensatory damages that arises from a single event
would be subject to aggregation. This would be the case regardless of how individual
in function or entitlement were the damage claims. Focusing on the plaintiffs' shared
or individual rights to collect the relief sought, as the Supreme Court cases require,
gives the correct and well-accepted result with respect to individual compensatory
damages. Because the right to recover those damages belongs only to each individ-
ual plaintiff, they are considered separate and distinct whether they arise from a sin-
gle event or separate transactions. Applying the entitlement analysis to punitive
damages claimed on behalf of a class yields the result that the plaintiffs own the right
to the relief sought as a group. See infra Part IV.
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harmed them and where the plaintiffs are entitled to punitive
damages as a group because the many identical, related acts of the
defendant harmed them. 60 Moreover, in both contexts the plain-
tiffs will share any punitive damages awarded to the class, thus
highlighting their common interest.
III. THE CASE FOR AGGREGATION
A number of courts have decided that a punitive damage
award claimed in a class action is a common and undivided interest
shared by all of the class members.61 Those courts have relied on
various combinations of three rationales to support their holdings.
First, the function of punitive damages under state law is punish-
ment and deterrence, not compensation, so class members share
an interest in a class punitive damage award designed to junish
class-wide wrongdoing. 62 Second, the fact that the punitive dam-
ages award would be proven by evidence regarding the defen-
dant's conduct toward the entire class, rather than individual evi-
dence for each class member, supports the conclusion that the
award "belongs" jointly to all of the class members.63 Third, once
a punitive damages award is made to the class, the success or fail-
ure of individual class members' claims would not affect the
overall size of the award.64 This Part examines these three ration-
ales.
A. The Nature and Function of Punitive Damages
Compensatory damages, as a general rule, have always been
considered separate and distinct interests because their function is
solely to compensate a single injured party for that party's injuries,
and the right to those damages belongs exclusively to that one
party.65 No individual class member can assert any rights to any
60. Drawing the line between single and separate underlying events could also
prove problematic. For example, victims of insurance fraud could attempt to show
that their injuries resulted from a single scheme to defraud, concocted by the defen-
dant and then implemented through separate insurance transactions.
61. See cases discussed infra Parts III.A-C
62. See infra Part III.A.
63. See infra Part III.B.
64. See infra Part III.C.
65. See, e.g., Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores a Pequena Escala 0 Arte-
sanales de Colombia v. Dow Quimica de Colombia, S.A., 988 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir.
1993) (holding that compensatory damages claimed by a putative class of fishermen
were separate and distinct because each class member sought only to recover for his
or her own individual economic and personal injuries).
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other class member's compensatory damages. Punitive damages,
on the other hand, serve no compensatory purpose under most
states' laws; rather, they are designed to further society's goals of
punishment and deterrence.66 In addition, most states view puni-
tive damages as left to the discretion of the trier of fact and hold
that no plaintiff has any right to receive punitive damages.67
A number of the courts that have allowed aggregation of pu-
nitive damages have relied on these features of the nature of puni-
tive damages to support their holdings. These courts reason that
the goal of a punitive damage award in a class action is to punish
and deter the defendant for its conduct toward the class as a
whole, a goal the class members have a collective interest in
achieving.68 In addition, unlike class members' claims for compen-
satory damages, the right to the class punitive damage award does
not "belong" to individual plaintiffs-it is a collective award de-
66. See, e.g., Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir.
1996) (applying Alabama law); Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1332-33
(5th Cir. 1995) (applying Mississippi law); Williams v. Monsanto Co., CIV.A.Nos.93-
4237, 94-3725, 94-3727, 1996 WL 162134, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 1996) (applying
Louisiana law); Turpeau v. Fidelity Fin. Serv., 936 F. Supp. 975, 979 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(applying Georgia law); Gilmer v. Walt Disney Co., 915 F. Supp. 1001, 1012-14
(W.D. Ark. 1996) (applying Arkansas law); Brooks v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 924 F.
Supp., 739,741 (M.D. La. 1996) (applying Louisiana law); In re Norplant Contracep-
tive Prod. Liab. Litig., 907 F. Supp. 244, 246 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (applying Texas law)
(citing Estate of Moore v. Commissioner, 53 F.3d 712,715 (5th Cir. 1995)). The Fifth
Circuit in Allen called this the "almost unanimous" view of the function of punitive
damages, noting that only Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Michigan recognize a
compensatory function for those damages. See Allen 63 F.3d at 1332 & n.10. (citing 1
LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 1.4(B), at 17 &
n.3 (2d ed. 1989)).
67. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
2, at 14 (5th ed. 1984).
68. See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1358-59; Allen, 63 F.3d at 1332-34; Lailhengue v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 775 F. Supp. 908, 913-14 (E.D. La. 1991); In re Northern Dist. Cal.
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 911 (N.D. Cal. 1981), va-
cated and remanded on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982). Although the
Allen court spent considerable energy discussing the fact that the role of punitive
damages under Mississippi law was in accord with the law of the vast majority of
states, the panel's opinion denying rehearing and rehearing en banc stated that its
result was one under Mississippi law only and was not to be interpreted as announc-
ing a holding applicable to other states' laws. See Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 70
F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1995). Courts that have followed Allen have ignored this remark,
concluding, as the Allen court did, that other states' punitive damages laws are func-
tionally identical to that of Mississippi. See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1358 (applying Ala-
bama law); Williams, 1996 WL 162134, at *2 (applying Louisiana law); Gilmer, 915 F.
Supp. at 1013-14 (applying Arkansas law); Brooks, 924 F. Supp. at 741 (applying
Louisiana law); In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., 907 F. Supp. at 246
(applying Texas law).
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signed to benefit the class as a whole, rather than being directed at
compensating individual plaintiffs.69 Due to these "fundamentally
collective" 70 goals served by an award of punitive damages in a
class action, courts have had little trouble characterizing such an
award as a common and undivided interest belonging to the class
as a whole, rather than to individual class members.
B. Reliance on Group Evidence
Some courts allowing aggregation look to the evidence that
will be used to prove the amount of damages for a particular claim
in order to classify it as separate and distinct or common and un-
divided. According to courts allowing aggregation, claims that
must be quantified by individual evidence are separate and dis-
tinct; claims that require proof only of the defendant's conduct to-
ward the class as a whole are deemed common and undivided.71
In a class action involving punitive damages, the amount of
those damages will be set by the trier of fact examining the defen-
dant's conduct toward the class as a whole; individual evidence re-
garding the wrong done to each class member will typically not be
considered.72 By bringing a punitive damage claim in a class ac-
tion, the plaintiffs are requesting the trier of fact to punish and de-
ter the defendant's conduct toward the class as a whole. Viewed in
this light, the reliance on evidence of the defendant's conduct to-
ward the class as a whole makes the punitive damages claimed for
the class common and undivided; if the amount of the award is set
by reference to group evidence, rather than individual factors
unique to each plaintiff, the punitive damages appear to be a re-
covery in which the class members share an interest. After all,
since the amount of the award is not determined by looking at
class members' individual evidence, the award is truly undivided
since no particular plaintiff can claim any entitlement to a particu-
69. See Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores, 988 F.2d at 563. However, some
courts have disagreed, concluding that their states' punitive damages laws reflected
individual, rather than collective, interests. See Harrison v. Union Carbide Corp.,
Civ.A.Nos. 95-1316, 95-1558, 95-1993, 95-2820,1995 WL 731672, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec.
7, 1995) (refusing to follow Allen because Louisiana punitive damages law is differ-
ent from Mississippi law); Pierson, 848 F. Supp. at 1189 (applying Pennsylvania law).
70. Allen, 63 F.3d at 1333.
71. See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1358-59; Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores, 988 F.2d
at 563; Williams, 1996 WL 162134, at *2; Lailhengue, 775 F. Supp. at 913-14.
72. See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1358; In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588, 593
(E.D. La. 1991).
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lar amount of the punitive damages.73
Of course, this rationale is closely related to the rationale re-
garding the nature and function of punitive damages discussed in
the preceding section, and may simply be the same argument ex-
plained in a different way. Regardless, by looking to whether the
amount of damages will be set by reference to individual or group
evidence, the courts have identified a useful factor that can aid in
distinguishing common and undivided interests from separate and
distinct ones.74
C. The Berman Test: The Defendant's Interest in the Distribution
of the Award and the Success or Failure of Individual Claims as
Affecting the Amount Recovered by Other Plaintiffs
Another method used by courts favoring aggregation of puni-
tive damages is a two-prong test to distinguish separate and dis-
tinct claims from common and undivided ones. This test is com-
monly associated with the First Circuit's decision in Berman v.
Narragansett Racing Association.75
In Berman a class of horse owners sued several horse tracks,
claiming that they were due a percentage of the track's
"breakage," that is, the money retained by the track owners after
they rounded down the payment of each winning bet to the nearest
73. In Tapscott the Eleventh Circuit qualified its holding that class action puni-
tive damages should be aggregated by noting that, in some instances, punitive dam-
ages claimed in a class action might be determined by looking at individual evidence.
In such cases, the court observed that "aggregation of punitive damages may very
well be inappropriate." Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1359 n.13. Following this logic, some
courts have refused to aggregate punitive damages when the amount of the damages
would be tied to each class member's individual compensatory damages. See
Borgeson v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co., 909 F. Supp. 709, 717-19 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(no aggregation of treble damages claimed under California's antitrust laws because
each class member's recovery of treble damages would be directly tied to his or her
compensatory damages); Pierson v. Source Perrier, S.A., 848 F. Supp. 1186, 1189
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (no aggregation because Pennsylvania law requires a "reasonable
relationship" between each class member's compensatory and punitive damages).
But see In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL
No. 997, 1996 WL 568793, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 1996) (allowing aggregation of
statutory penalties under the Alabama antitrust statute).
74. The Supreme Court endorsed the idea that the type of evidence used to es-
tablish a claim for damages is relevant to the aggregation inquiry. In Shields v. Tho-
mas, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 3 (1854), the Court, discussing the aggregation rule, cited
prior cases where compensatory damages were held to be separate and distinct be-
cause each plaintiffs claim rested "altogether on its own evidence and merits." Id. at
3.
75. 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969).
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dime.76 The Berman court accepted the argument that the class of
horse owners possessed a common and undivided interest in the
breakage fund and aggregated their claims to reach the jurisdic-
tional amount.77 The court placed heavy reliance on two closely
related factors: (1) that the amount of the defendant's liability
would remain fixed no matter how the fund was divided among the
plaintiffs, so the defendant had no interest in how the amount re-
covered was divided among the plaintiffs, and (2) that the success
or failure of individual plaintiffs' claims would increase or de-
crease the amount recovered by other class members.78
The Berman test for determining whether a particular interest
is separate and distinct or common and undivided has been ac-
cepted by some courts,7 9 but others have argued that Berman was
impliedly overruled by Zahn.80 The courts expressing the latter
view seem to read Zahn as forbidding aggregation in all Rule
76. See id. at 313.
77. See id. at 314-16.
78. See id. These two factors are really two sides of the same coin. If a fund is
recovered for a group of plaintiffs who must then divide it among themselves, any
fund that remains fixed in amount regardless of the number of plaintiffs who share it
will necessarily also meet the second part of the test because each plaintiff will re-
ceive more if fewer class members share the fund.
In addition, the emphasis on whether the defendant has any interest in the
apportionment of the award among the plaintiffs is a bit misleading. Any time an
award is made on a group basis, the defendant will be disinterested in the distribu-
tion of the recovery. However, when plaintiffs have separate and distinct claims, the
defendant will have the incentive to challenge each plaintiff's entitlement to recov-
ery since doing so will reduce its overall liability. In the common and undivided con-
text, the defendant gains nothing by challenging a particular plaintiff's entitlement to
share in the award because dollars not collected by that plaintiff will simply be
shared by the other plaintiffs rather than reducing the defendant's overall liability.
The Berman court explained this in a roundabout manner by announcing the rule
about the defendant's lack of interest in the plaintiffs' division of the recovery and
then highlighting the fact that the defendant's total liability would remain the same
no matter how the recovery was divided among the plaintiffs. See id. at 316.
79. See Sellers v. O'Connell, 701 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1983) ("An identifying
characteristic of a common and undivided interest is that if one plaintiff cannot or
does not collect his share, the shares of the remaining plaintiffs are increased."); see
also Asociacion National de Pescadores a Pequena Escala 0 Artesasales de Colom-
bia v. Dow Quimica de Colombia, 988 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding an in-
terest separate and distinct because "in this case one plaintiff's recovery is neither
dependent upon, nor necessarily reduced by, another's"). For cases that accept the
Berman test and apply it to allow punitive damages aggregation, see cases cited infra
note 83.
80. See United States v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 683 (9th Cir.
1976); Borgeson v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co., 909 F. Supp. 709, 718 (C.D. Cal.
1995); Kasky v. Perrier Group of America, Inc., No. Civ.91-0489-R(M), 1991 WL
577038, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1991).
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23(b)(3) class actions, but Zahn assumed that the interests of its
class members were separate and distinct and did not decide the
issue of whether members of a 23(b)(3) class could ever have
common and undivided interests.81 The holding of Zahn, that all
class members with separate and distinct demands must individu-
ally satisfy the jurisdictional amount, had nothing to do with the
tests enunciated in Berman, and the argument that Zahn in some
way overruled Berman ignores the distinct nature of the issues pre-
sented in the two cases. Zahn gave the lower courts no guidance
on how to distinguish between common and undivided and sepa-
rate and distinct interests, which was the focus in Berman. Moreo-
ver, the Berman test makes logical sense; if a fund is awarded to a
class of plaintiffs and will remain fixed in amount no matter how
many plaintiffs divide it, then it looks very much like a recovery
for the class as a group, rather than simply an assemblage of indi-
vidual claims awarded together for convenience. If we define a
common and undivided interest as one that belongs to the group,
rather than to individual plaintiffs, the Berman test does an excel-
lent job of isolating such interests. Finally, the Berman test, with
its focus on the defendant's lack of interest in the apportionment
of a fund awarded to a group, finds direct support in a number of
older Supreme Court cases applying the traditional aggregation
rule.82
A punitive damage fund sought in a class action has both of
the characteristics of the fund discussed in Berman, which led the
First Circuit to allow aggregation in that case. The punitive dam-
ages would be awarded as a single fund for the benefit of the
whole class and the amount of the award would be based upon the
conduct of the defendant with respect to the class as a whole-not
81. For more discussion, see supra note 15, and supra notes 25-30 and accompa-
nying text. See also 1 MOORE ET AL., supra note 15, 0.97[5], at 933 (stating that "it
is important to remember that the determination of whether aggregation is proper is
independent of the type of class action asserted").
82. See Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U.S. 27, 30 (1887) (holding that an interest is
common and undivided if the plaintiffs "claim it under one common right, the ad-
verse party having no interest in its apportionment or distribution among them" and
contrasting separate and distinct claims as ones that are challenged as to each indi-
vidual plaintiff by the defendant); Davies v. Corbin, 112 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1884)
(holding an interest common and undivided because the defendant had no interest in
the plaintiffs' division of the recovery among themselves); The "Connemara", 103
U.S. 754, 755 (1880) (holding that claim was common and undivided where the
amount was due the plaintiffs collectively rather than individually); Shields v. Tho-
mas, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 3,5 (1854).
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the defendant's conduct with respect to any single plaintiff. Once
the punitive damages were assessed, its amount would remain
fixed no matter whether it was ultimately shared by ten or ten
thousand plaintiffs.8 3 Thus, the success or failure of individual
class members' claims would necessarily reduce or enlarge the
share received by all of the other class members.84 In addition, the
defendant's liability for the punitive damages would be the same
regardless of how the award was distributed among the plaintiff
class members.85 These characteristics show that a class punitive
damage award is a common and undivided award for the benefit of
the class as a group, rather than simply a collection of awards that
can be allocated to individual plaintiffs.
The function and nature of punitive damages under state law,
the reliance on evidence of class-wide wrongdoing by the defen-
dant, and the Berman test all support the conclusion that a class
punitive damage award is a common and undivided interest held
by the class as a group. Some courts, however, have resisted ag-
gregating punitive damages to reach the $50,000 threshold re-
quired for diversity jurisdiction. The next Part of this Article
compares the arguments for and against aggregation and concludes
that the courts allowing aggregation have the better argument.
IV. IN SUPPORT OF AGGREGATION
The aggregation of punitive damages in class actions to reach
the federal jurisdictional amount is an issue that has sparked con-
troversy among the federal district courts. A number of courts
have rejected the argument that a class of plaintiffs has a common
and undivided interest in a punitive damage recovery, but the ra-
tionales offered in opposition to aggregation are largely unsatisfy-
ing. Courts rejecting aggregation on the basis of Zahn misinter-
pret the case; Zahn did not offer any guidance in determining
whether a set of plaintiffs have common or separate interests.
Courts placing emphasis on the availability of individual actions
for the class members have neglected to analyze the aggregation
83. See Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1359 & n.14 (11th Cir.
1996); Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1334 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Ber-
man, 414 F.2d at 316); Lailhengue v. Mobil Oil Corp., 775 F. Supp. 908, 913-14 (E.D.
La. 1991); In re Northern Dist. Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F.
Supp. 887, 911 n.117 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
84. See supra note 83.
85. See supra note 83.
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issue in the context actually presented, where the plaintiffs have
joined together to prosecute their action as a group. In addition,
the Supreme Court's aggregation cases do not establish the avail-
ability of individual actions as a test for differentiating between
common and undivided and separate and distinct interests. Fur-
ther, courts emphasizing the right to individual lawsuits have ig-
nored the practical effect the first plaintiffs' recovery of punitive
damages might have on later plaintiffs; the first successful claimant
might exhaust or reduce the punitive damages available for suc-
cessive plaintiffs. Finally, courts emphasizing the transactional
source of the class members' claims ignore precedent and fail to
draw a distinction between the nature of punitive and compensa-
tory recoveries-a punitive damage fund sought by a class to pun-
ish a defendant for a course of conduct affecting the entire class
belongs more logically to the class as a whole than to the individ-
ual class members.
Courts that have allowed aggregation have recognized that a
punitive damage fund sought by a plaintiff class has all of the char-
acteristics traditionally used to describe a common and undivided
interest. The punitive damages award would be decided by a jury
considering the defendant's conduct with respect to the class as a
whole and ignoring the merits of any particular plaintiff's claim.
The punitive damages would not serve the compensatory interests
of individual class members but society's goals of punishment and
deterrence. The award, once fixed, would remain the same in
amount no matter how many plaintiffs ultimately divided it, and
the success or failure of each class member's claim for a piece of
the punitive damage fund would directly affect the amount avail-
able to the other class members. It is difficult to see how a recov-
ery could be more common and undivided than one possessing all
of these characteristics.
The pro-aggregation courts also adhere more closely to the
Supreme Court's guidance on this issue. The Berman test for de-
termining whether a recovery is common and undivided or sepa-
rate and distinct traces its roots back to the earliest Supreme Court
decisions interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1332, decisions that the Court
has reaffirmed in modem cases. 86 Courts rejecting aggregation
have done so by varying the legal rules enunciated by the Supreme
86. See Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311, 315 (1st Cir. 1969);
see also notes 54-59 and accompanying text..
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Court. An excellent example is the requirement announced by
some courts that common and undivided interests arise from the
same transaction.8 7 That requirement is soundly rejected by the
Supreme Court's aggregation holdings, a fact that many lower
courts have overlooked. Applying the traditional aggregation
rules to a class punitive damages award easily results in the con-
clusion that the award is a common and undivided interest, and
those courts reaching the opposite conclusion have done so by ei-
ther ignoring or contorting those rules.
Finally, courts that have allowed aggregation have interpreted
28 U.S.C. § 1332 in a manner consistent with its policy justifica-
tions. The two most frequently cited justifications for diversity ju-
risdiction support aggregation. If diversity jurisdiction is necessary
to protect out-of-state defendants from the bias of local courts,88 it
makes little sense to argue that a defendant's interest in avoiding
bias is not substantial enough to warrant federal jurisdiction in
large class actions with many millions of dollars at stake. If diver-
sity jurisdiction is necessary to allow substantial cases access to
higher-quality federal courts,89 large, complex class actions are
clearly deserving of jurisdiction-a higher-quality court is surely
better able to handle the complex issues characteristic of class ac-
tions. In addition, the policies of judicial economy and consistency
argue in favor of aggregation. Keeping large class actions in state
court raises the possibility of numerous parallel class actions pro-
ceeding in separate state courts to challenge the same conduct.
Allowing these cases access to the federal courts creates opportu-
nities for use of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
which can avoid duplicative litigation and assure consistent results,
at least at the pretrial stage. Aggregation of punitive damages in-
terprets § 1332 to achieve the goals traditionally assigned to diver-
sity jurisdiction.
Now that aggregation of punitive damages is the law in two
circuits, there will be some changes in class action practice. First,
for those class actions where claims for punitive damages are likely
to be susceptible of class-wide treatment,90 federal courts may be-
87. See supra note 44.
88. See supra note 38.
89. See supra note 38.
90. An excellent example would be a products liability class action where the
plaintiffs seek punitive damages for the defendant's reckless design of a particular
product.
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come the arena for more litigation, either by defendants' removals
or plaintiffs' filings of such cases in federal court. As a result, we
might predict greater use of the Multidistrict Panel in mass tort
cases that were previously confined to various state courts.
For other types of class actions, we can expect plaintiffs' at-
torneys to think twice before asserting a claim for punitive dam-
ages. For example, a consumer credit class action for statutory
damages or penalties might be filed in state court without any
claim for common-law fraud, if the plaintiffs wish to stay in state
court. A fraud claim is typically thought to be unsuited to class
treatment due to individual issues of reliance that would have to
be established for each class member. Dismissing such a claim
'would allow plaintiffs to remain in state court in exchange for con-
fining their claims to more modest claims for compensatory dam-
ages and statutory penalties.
For those plaintiffs who wish to assert punitive damage claims
and remain in state court, we might predict a greater incidence of
procedural manipulation-more intensive efforts to find and join a
nondiverse defendant or efforts to avoid asserting a claim for pu-
nitive damages until after the one-year time limit for removal of
diversity cases91 has expired. We can expect more removals based
on fraudulent joinder arguments and more litigation over equita-
ble exceptions to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) as defendants attempt to
counter these measures.
Finally, the cases allowing aggregation of punitive damages
might give rise to even further expansion of diversity jurisdiction
in class actions. Following Allen and Tapscott, district courts might
use similar analyses to hold that attorney's fees or injunctive relief
sought in class actions are also common and undivided interests.92
These expansions of diversity jurisdiction, if not reversed by the
Supreme Court, will likely intensify the calls for the abolition of
diversity jurisdiction or at least for a legislative pronouncement re-
garding aggregation.
91. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1995).
92. See Earnest v. General Motors Corp., 923 F. Supp. 1469, 1472 (N.D. Ala.
1996) (following Tapscott and holding that both punitive damages and injunctive re-
lief were common interests of the class). But see Blair v. Source One Mortgage
Servs. Corp., 925 F. Supp. 617, 622 (D. Minn. 1996) (stating that injunctive relief
cannot be aggregated).
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V. CONCLUSION
The increased use of the class action device and the ubiquity
of claims for punitive damages in the class action context have cre-
ated a previously unrecognized common and undivided interest.
The traditional aggregation rules compel the conclusion that puni-
tive damages sought for a class of plaintiffs are common and undi-
vided. Allowing aggregation of class action punitive damages pre-
serves the integrity of the traditional aggregation rules and
represents an exercise of diversity jurisdiction where it is most
needed-in complex cases that are most likely to benefit from a
federal forum.93 Before rejecting aggregation of punitive dam-
ages, courts outside the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits should give
careful consideration to this argument's historical foundations and
policy justifications.
93. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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